Decidability of the validity problem is established for a family of many-valued modal logics, notably Gödel modal logics, where propositional connectives are evaluated according to the order of values in a complete sublattice of the real unit interval [0, 1], and box and diamond modalities are evaluated as infima and suprema over (many-valued) Kripke frames. If the sublattice is infinite and the language is sufficiently expressive, then the standard semantics for such a logic lacks the finite model property. It is shown here, however, that, given certain regularity conditions, the finite model property holds for a new semantics for the logic, providing a basis for establishing decidability and PSPACE-completeness. Similar results are also established for S5 logics that coincide with one-variable fragments of first-order many-valued logics. In particular, a first proof is given of $ Preliminary results from this work were reported in the proceedings of TACL 2013 (as an extended abstract) and WoLLIC 2013 [8] .
the intuitionistic connectives. We remark also that, unlike the operations added to infinite-valued logics in [11, 20] , which represent truth stressers such as "very true" or "classically true", the modalities considered here cannot be interpreted simply as unary connectives on the real unit interval [0, 1].
The first main contribution of this paper is to establish PSPACE-completeness results (matching the complexity of the classical modal logic K [25] ) for the validity problem of Gödel modal logics and other order-based modal logics defined over complete sublattices of [0, 1] satisfying certain local regularity conditions (e.g., sublattices order-isomorphic to the positive integers with an added top element and the negative integers with an added bottom element). The finite model property typically fails even for the box and diamond fragments of these logics. Decidability and PSPACE-completeness of the validity problem for these fragments of Gödel modal logics over [0, 1] was established in [27] using analytic Gentzen-style proof systems, but this methodology does not seem to extend easily to the full logics. Here, alternative Kripke semantics are provided for order-based modal logics that not only have the same valid formulas as the original semantics, but also admit the finite model property. The key idea of this new semantics is to restrict evaluations of modal formulas at a world to a particular set of truth values.
The second main contribution of the paper is to establish co-NP-completeness results for the validity problem of crisp order-based "S5" logics: order-based modal logics where accessibility is an equivalence relation. Such logics may be interpreted also as one-variable fragments of first-order many-valued logics. In particular, the open decidability problem for validity in the one-variable fragment of first-order Gödel logic (see, e.g., [19, Chapter 9 , Problem 13])) is answered positively and shown to be co-NP-complete. This result matches the complexity of the one-variable fragments of classical first-order logic (equivalently, S5) and first-order Łukasiewicz logic (see [19] ), and contrasts with the co-NEXPTIMEcompleteness of the one-variable fragment of first-order intuitionistic logic (equivalently, the intuitionistic modal logic MIPC) [26] .
Order-Based Modal Logics
We consider "order-based" modal logics where propositional connectives are interpreted at individual worlds in an algebra consisting of a complete sublattice of [0, 1], ∧, ∨, 0, 1 with operations defined based only on the order. Modalities and ♦ are defined using infima and suprema, respectively, according to either a (crisp, i.e., Boolean-valued) binary relation on the set of worlds or a binary mapping (many-valued relation) from worlds to values of the algebra. For con-venience, we consider only finite algebraic languages, noting that to decide the validity of a formula we may in any case restrict to the language containing only operation symbols occurring in that formula.
We reserve the symbols ⇒, &, ∼, and ≈ to denote implication, conjunction, negation, and equality, respectively, in classical first-order logic. We also recall an appropriate notion of first-order definability of operations for algebraic structures. Let L be an algebraic language, A an algebra for L, and L a sublanguage of L. An operation f : A n → A is defined in A by a first-order L -formula F (x 1 , . . . , x n , y) with free variables x 1 , . . . , x n , y if for all a 1 , . . . , a n , b ∈ A,
A |= F (a 1 , . . . , a n , b) ⇔ f (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = b.
Order-Based Algebras
Let L be a finite algebraic language that includes the binary operation symbols ∧ and ∨ and constant symbols0 and1 (to be interpreted by the usual lattice operations), and denote the finite set of constants (nullary operation symbols) of this language by C L . An algebra A for L will be called order-based if it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) A, ∧ A , ∨ A , 0, 1 is a complete sublattice of [0, 1], min, max, 0, 1 ; i.e., (2) For each operation symbol of L, the operation A is definable in A by a quantifier-free first-order formula in the algebraic language consisting of ∧, ∨, and constants from C L .
We also let C A L denote the finite set of constant operations {c A : c ∈ C L } and define R(A) and L(A) to be the sets of right and left accumulation points, respectively, of A in the usual topology inherited from [0, 1]; that is, a ∈ R(A) ⇔ there is a c ∈ A such that a < A c and for all such c, there is an e ∈ A such that a < A e < A c. b ∈ L(A) ⇔ there is a d ∈ A such that d < A b, and for all such d,
there is an f ∈ A such that d < A f < A b.
Note that, because A is a chain, an implication operation → A may always be introduced as the residual of ∧ A :
Let s ≤ t stand for s ∧ t ≈ s and let s < t stand for (s ≤ t) & ∼(s ≈ t). Then the implication operation → A is definable in A by the quantifier-free first-order formula F → (x, y, z) = ((x ≤ y) ⇒ (z ≈1)) & ((y < x) ⇒ (z ≈ y)).
That is, for all a, b, c ∈ A,
In this paper, the connective → will always be interpreted by → A in A. We will also make use of the negation connective ¬ϕ := ϕ →0, which is interpreted by the unary operation
Examples of other useful operations (see, e.g., [1] ) covered by the order-based approach are the globalization and Nabla operators For the remainder of this work, we will omit the superscript A when the algebra or order is clear from the context.
Many-Valued Kripke Semantics
Let us fix a finite language L including the operational symbols1,0, ∧, ∨, and →, and an order-based algebra A for L. We define order-based modal logics K(A) C and K(A) based on standard (crisp) Kripke frames and Kripke frames with an accessibility relation taking values in A, respectively.
An A-frame is a pair F = W, R such that W is a non-empty set of worlds and R : W × W → A is an A-accessibility relation on W . If Rxy ∈ {0, 1} for all x, y ∈ W , then R is crisp and F is called a crisp A-frame. In this case, we often write R ⊆ W × W and Rxy to mean Rxy = 1. Now let Fm be the set of formulas, denoted by ϕ, ψ, χ . . ., of the language L with additional unary operation symbols (modal connectives) and ♦, defined inductively over a countably infinite set Var of propositional variables, denoted by p, q, . . .. We call formulas of the form ϕ and ♦ϕ box-formulas and diamondformulas, respectively. Subformulas are defined as usual, and the length of a formula ϕ, denoted by (ϕ), is the total number of occurrences of subformulas in ϕ. We also let Var(ϕ) denote the set of variables occurring in the formula ϕ.
A
for each n-ary operation symbol of L, and
A K(A) C -model satisfies the extra condition that W, R is a crisp Aframe. In this case, the conditions for and ♦ simplify to
If ϕ is valid in all L-models for some logic L, then ϕ is said to be L-valid, written |= L ϕ. We now introduce some useful notation and terminology. A subset Σ ⊆ Fm will be called a fragment if it contains all constants in C L and is closed with respect to taking subformulas. For a formula ϕ ∈ Fm, we let Σ(ϕ) be the smallest (always finite) fragment containing ϕ. Also, for any K(A)-model M = W, R, V , subset X ⊆ W , and fragment Σ ⊆ Fm, we let
For Σ ⊆ Fm, we let Σ and Σ ♦ be the sets of all box-formulas in Σ and diamond-formulas in Σ, respectively.
Given a linearly ordered set P, ≤ and C ⊆ P , a map h : P → P will be called a C-order embedding if it is an order-preserving embedding (i.e., a ≤ b if and only if h(a) ≤ h(b) for all a, b ∈ P ) satisfying h(c) = c for all c ∈ C. We will call an order embedding h : P → P inflationary or deflationary if for all a ∈ P , a ≤ h(a), or for all a ∈ P , a ≥ h(a), respectively. h will be called B-complete
The following lemma establishes the critical property of order-based modal logics for our purposes. Namely, it is only the relative order of the values taken by variables and the accessibility relation between worlds that plays a role in determining the values of formulas and checking validity. 
Proof. We proceed by induction on (ϕ). The case ϕ ∈ Var ∪ C L follows from the definition of V . For the induction step, suppose that ϕ = (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ) for some operation symbol of L and ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ∈ Σ. Recall that is definable in A by some quantifier-free first-order formula F (x 1 , . . . , x n , y) in the first-order language with ∧, ∨, and constants from C L , i.e.
(a 1 , . . . , a n ) = b ⇔ A |= F (a 1 , . . . , a n , b).
Because F (x 1 , . . . , x n , y) is quantifier-free and h preserves ∧, ∨, and C L ,
A |= F (a 1 , . . . , a n , b) ⇔ A |= F (h(a 1 ), . . . , h(a n ), h(b)).
So we may also conclude
(h(a 1 ), . . . , h(a n )) = h( (a 1 , . . . , a n )).
Hence for all x ∈ W , using the induction hypothesis for the step from (1) to (2):
If ϕ = ♦ψ for some ψ ∈ Σ, then we obtain for all x ∈ W :
(5) to (6) follows from the definition of R and the induction hypothesis, (6) to (7) follows because h is an order embedding, and (7) to (8) 
The case ϕ = ψ is very similar.
We now consider many-valued analogues of some useful notions and results from classical modal logic (see, e.g., [4] ). For an A-frame W, R , we define the crisp relation R + as follows: Proof. We proceed by induction on (ϕ). The base case is trivial for any submodel of M, so also for M. For the induction step, the case where ϕ = (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ) for some operation symbol follows immediately using the induction hypothesis. Suppose now that ϕ = ψ. Fix x ∈ W and note that for any y ∈ W \ W , we have Rxy = 0. Observe also that 0 → a = 1 for all a ∈ A. Hence, excluding all worlds y ∈ W such that Rxy = 0 does not change the value of {Rxy → V (ψ, y) : y ∈ W }. So, using the induction hypothesis,
The case where ϕ = ♦ψ is very similar.
Following the usual terminology of modal logic, a tree is defined as a relational structure T, S such that (i) S ⊆ T 2 is irreflexive, (ii) there exists a unique root 
Proof. Consider the K(A)-model M = W , R , V obtained by "unravelling" M at the world x 0 ; i.e., for all n ∈ N (noting that 0 ∈ N),
Clearly, M is a K(A)-tree-model with root x 0 = (x 0 ). Now let M = W , R, V be the K(A)-tree-submodel of M defined by cutting M at depth k; i.e., let W = {(x 0 , . . . , x n ) ∈ W : n ≤ k} and let R and V be the restrictions of R and V to W × W and Var× W , respectively. A straightforward induction on (ϕ) shows that for all ϕ ∈ Fm and n ∈ N such that (ϕ) ≤ k−n, V (ϕ, (x 0 , . . . , x n )) = V (ϕ, x n ).
Gödel Modal Logics
The "Gödel modal logics" GK and GK C studied in [9, 10, 27] are K(G) and K(G) C , respectively, defined with respect to the infinite-valued Gödel algebra
Axiomatizations of the box and diamond fragments of GK are obtained in [9] as extensions of an axiomatization of Gödel logic (intuitionistic logic plus the prelinearity axiom schema (ϕ → ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ)) with, respectively,
An axiomatization of the full logic GK is obtained in [10] by extending the union of these axiomatizations with the Fischer Servi axioms (see [34] )
It is also shown in [10] that GK coincides with the extension of the intuitionistic modal logic IK (see [34] ) with the prelinearity axiom schema (ϕ → ψ)∨(ψ → ϕ).
No axiomatization has yet been found for the full logic GK C . However, the box fragment of GK C coincides with the box fragment of GK [9] , and the diamond fragment of GK C is axiomatized in [27] as an extension of the diamond fragment of GK with
More generally, we may consider the family of Gödel modal logics K(A) and
Clearly, order-based algebras with universes G ↓ and G ↑ are isomorphic to algebras with universes {−n : n ∈ N} ∪ {−∞} and N ∪ {∞}, respectively. It is not hard to show (see below) that for finite A, the sets of valid formulas of K(A) and K(A) C depend only on the cardinality of A and are decidable. Note, moreover, that although all infinite subalgebras of G produce the same set of valid propositional formulas [14] , there are countably infinitely many different infinitevalued first-order Gödel logics (considered as sets of valid formulas) [2] . This result holds also for Gödel modal logics.
Proposition 4. There are countably infinitely many different logics K(A) (considered as sets of valid formulas), where A is an infinite subalgebra of G. Moreover, the same is true for K(A) C .
Proof. By the mentioned result of [2] , there are at most countably many such logics. Just note that for each infinite subalgebra A of G, the modal logic K(A) corresponds to a specific fragment of the first-order logic over A, determined by the same standard translation π as in the classical setting, where box-and diamond-formulas are translated as follows: π( ϕ) = (∀y)(Rxy → π(ϕ)(y)) and π(♦ϕ) = (∃y)(Rxy ∧ π(ϕ)(y)).
To obtain the fragment in the crisp case, we may use the usual "crispification" of the relation symbol R by prefixing it with ¬¬.
To show that there are infinitely many such logics, let us fix, for each n ∈ Z + , a complete subalgebra A n of G with exactly n right accumulation points (i.e., |R(A)| = n). We then prove that for all distinct n, m ∈ Z + , the logics K(A n ) and K(A m ) are mutually distinct, and so are K c (A n ) and K c (A m ). For this, we define
which detects right accumulation points, and for each n ∈ Z + , let
We leave the reader to show that for each n ∈ Z + , the formula ϕ n is K(A)-valid if and only if |R(A)| < n.
The logics K(G), K(G ↑ ), and K(G ↓ ) and their crisp counterparts are all distinct. The formula ¬¬p → ¬¬ p is valid in the logics based on G ↑ , but not in those based on G or G ↓ . To see this, note that 0 is an accumulation point in [0, 1] and G ↓ (but not in G ↑ ); hence for these sets there is an infinite strictly descending sequence of values (a i ) i∈I with limit 0, giving ¬¬a i = 1 for each i ∈ I and inf i∈I ¬¬a i = 1, while ¬¬ inf i∈I a i = ¬¬0 = 0 (see the proof of Theorem 7). Similarly, (♦p → ♦q) → (¬♦q ∨ ♦(p → q)) is valid in the logics based on G ↓ but not those based on G. Moreover, the formula ¬¬♦p → ♦¬¬p is valid in any of the crisp logics, but not in their non-crisp versions.
The Finite Model Property
Let us call an L-model for a logic L countable or finite if its set of worlds is countable or finite, respectively. We say that a logic L has the finite model property if validity in the logic coincides with validity in all finite L-models. Observe first that if the underlying algebra of an order-based modal logic is finite, then the logic has the finite model property.
Lemma 5. If A is a finite order-based algebra, then K(A) and K(A) C have the finite model property.
Proof. By Lemma 3, it suffices to show that for any finite fragment Σ ⊆ Fm and 
and R and V are R and V , respectively, restricted to W . An easy induction on
We are also able to establish the finite model property when the underlying (infinite) algebra is G ↑ . Theorem 6. K(G ↑ ) and K(G ↑ ) C have the finite model property.
Proof. By Lemmas 3 and 5, it suffices to show that if ϕ ∈ Fm is not valid in some
) for all y ∈ W and ψ ∈ Fm by induction on (ψ). The base case follows by definition (recalling that the only constants are0 and1). For the induction step, the propositional cases follow by observing that h is a Heyting algebra homomorphism (i.e., preserves the operations ∧, ∨, →,0, and1). The case of ψ = χ is also straightforward. If ψ = ♦χ, then
The step from (10) to (11) follows using the induction hypothesis and the step from (11) to (12) follows because h is a Heyting algebra homomorphism. For the step from (12) to (13) , note that for
The finite model property does not hold, however, for Gödel modal logics with universe [0, 1] or G ↓ , or even G ↑ if we add also the connective ∆ to the language. The problem in these cases stems from the existence of accumulation points in the universe of truth values considered together with the non-continuous operation ¬ or ∆. If infinitely many worlds are accessible from a world x, then the value taken by a formula ϕ (or ♦ϕ) at x will be the infimum (supremum) of values calculated from values of ϕ at these worlds, but may not be the minimum (maximum). A formula may therefore not be valid in such a model, but valid in all finite models where infima (suprema) and minima (maxima) coincide.
Theorem 7. Suppose that either (i) the universe of A is [0, 1] or G ↓ , or (ii) the universe of A is G ↑ and the language contains ∆. Then neither K(A) nor K(A) C has the finite model property.
Proof. For (i), we follow [9] where it is shown that the following formula provides a counterexample to the finite model property of GK and GK C :
Just observe that the formula is valid in all finite K(A)-models, but not in the infinite Similarly, for (ii), the formula
where Rmn = 1 for all m, n ∈ N and V (p, n) = n n+1 for all n ∈ N. Let us remark also that decidability and indeed PSPACE-completeness of validity in the box and diamond fragments of both GK and GK C have been established in [27] using analytic Gentzen-style proof systems, but that decidability of validity in the full logics GK and GK C has remained open.
A New Semantics for the Modal Operators
Consider again the failure of the finite model property for GK C established in the proof of Theorem 7. For a GK C -model to render ¬¬p → ¬¬ p invalid at a world x, there must be values of p at worlds accessible to x that form an infinite descending sequence tending to but never reaching 0. This ensures that the infinite model falsifies the formula, but also that no particular world acts as a "witness" to the value of p. Here, we redefine models to restrict the values at each world that can be taken by box-formulas and diamond-formulas. A formula such as p can then be "witnessed" at a world where the value of p is merely "sufficiently close" to the value of p.
To ensure that these redefined models accept the same valid formulas as the original models, we restrict our attention to order-based algebras where the order satisfies a certain homogeneity property. Recall that R(A) and L(A) are the sets of right and left accumulation points, respectively, of an order-based algebra A in the usual topology inherited from [0, 1]. Note also that by
We say that A is locally right homogeneous if for any a ∈ R(A), there is a c ∈ A such that a < c and for any e ∈ (a, c), there is a complete deflationary order embedding h : [a, c) → [a, e) such that h(a) = a. In this case, c is called a witness of right homogeneity at a. Similarly, A is said to be locally left homogeneous if for any
In this case, d is called a witness of left homogeneity at b. We will call A locally homogeneous if it is both locally right homogeneous and locally left homogeneous.
Observe that if c ∈ A is a witness of right homogeneity at a, then any e ∈ (a, c) will also be a witness of right homogeneity at a. Hence c can be chosen sufficiently close to a so that (a, c) is disjoint to any given finite subset of A. A similar observation holds for witnesses of left homogeneity. 
The valuation V is extended to the mapping V : Fm × W inductively as follows:
for each n-ary operational symbol of L, and
As before, an FK(A) C -model satisfies the extra condition that W, R is a crisp A-frame, and the conditions for and ♦ simplify to
both T (x) and T ♦ (x) are obtained by removing finitely many arbitrary disjoint intervals (a, b) not containing constants. For A = G ↓ , the only possibilities are
It is worth pointing out that in every FK(A)-model M = W, R, V, T , T ♦ and for any x ∈ W , T (x) and T ♦ (x) will be complete subsets of A. Hence, the suprema and infima defining V ( ϕ, x) and V (♦ϕ, x) will actually be maxima and minima, and
We now extend some previously introduced notions to FK(A)-models. Given
implies z ∈ W . Lemmas 2 and 3 then extend to FK(A)-models as follows with minimal changes in the proofs.
The same formula fails in a similar finite
Indeed, as shown below, given an FK(A)-tree-model of finite height where ϕ ∈ Fm is not valid, we can always "prune" (i.e., remove branches from) the model in such a way that ϕ is still not valid in the resulting finite 
and R and V are R and V , respectively, restricted to W . T (z) and T ♦ (z) are defined as T y (z) and T ♦y (z), respectively, if z ∈ W y , for some y ∈ Y . T (x) and T ♦ (x) are defined as above.
Observe that W , R, V ⊆ W, R, V , x ∈ W is the root of M, and | W | ≤ |Y ||Σ| n + 1 < |Σ||Σ| n = |Σ| hg(M) . Moreover, for each y ∈ Y , M y is an FK(A)submodel of M generated by y. Hence, by Lemma 10(a) and the induction hypothesis, for all ϕ ∈ Σ,
We show now that V (ϕ, x) = V (ϕ, x) for all ϕ ∈ Σ, proceeding by induction on (ϕ). The base case follows directly from the definition of V . For the inductive step, the non-modal cases follow directly using the induction hypothesis. For ϕ = ψ, there are two cases. Suppose first that V ( ψ, x) = a / ∈ R(A) and recall that
This implies that Rxy → V (ψ, y) ≥ a for all y ∈ Y ⊆ R + [x]. Hence, by (15) ,
For the second case, suppose that V ( ψ, x) = a ∈ R(A). Then a = a i , for some i ∈ I ∪ J, and we observe that
By (15), we know that Rxy → V (ψ, y) = Rxy → V (ψ, y) for each y ∈ W , and because W ⊆ W , it follows that
By the choice of y ϕ ∈ W ,
The case where ϕ = ♦ψ is very similar. 
Equivalence of the Semantics
Let us assume again that A is a locally homogeneous order-based algebra. We devote this section to establishing that a formula is valid in K(A) or K(A) C if and only if it is valid in FK(A) or FK(A) C , respectively. Observe first that any K(A)model can be extended to an FK(A)-model with the same valid formulas simply by defining T and T ♦ to be constantly A. Hence any FK(A)-valid formula is also K(A)-valid. We therefore turn our attention to the other (much harder) direction: proving that any K(A)-valid formula is also FK(A)-valid.
The main ingredient of the proof (see Lemma 16) is the construction of a K(A)-treemodel taking the same values for formulas at its root as a given FK(A)tree-model. Note that the original FK(A)-treemodel without the functions T and T ♦ cannot play this role in general; in [0, 1], for example, the infimum or supremum required for calculating the value of a box-formula or diamond-formula at the root x might not be in the set T (x) or T ♦ (x). This problem is resolved by taking infinitely many copies of an inductively defined K(A)-model in such a way that certain parts of the intervals in A missing in T (x) or T ♦ (x) are "squeezed" closer to either their lower or upper bounds. The obtained infima and suprema will then coincide with the next smaller or larger member of T (x) and T ♦ (x): that is, the required values of the formulas at x in the original FK(A)-tree-model. For each k ≥ 2, we then consider A central tool in the proof of Lemma 16 is the following result which allows the "squeezing" of K(A)-models so that the values of formulas are arbitrarily close to certain points (as in Example 14) . Intuitively, in the proof of Lemma 16, the set B below (in Lemma 15) will be the set of values at the root world x of all box-formulas and diamond-formulas in some fragment Σ. In (a) below, the values a and c will denote the endpoints of the removed interval and s will be the relevant value that we want to squeeze closer and closer towards a. The value t, the upper endpoint of the squeezed interval, will then be chosen in A\(B∩L(A)) in order to ensure that all the suprema in B (relevant for determining the values of diamond-M: 
For each ϕ ∈ Σ ∪ Σ ♦ , we will choose a world y ϕ ∈ R + [x] as described below and then, using Lemma 15, define for each k ∈ Z + a copy of the K(A)- (i) Suppose that V ( ψ, x) = a i for some i ∈ I. Recalling that
there must be a world y ϕ ∈ R + [x] such that
, which is countable because W yϕ is countable and Σ ∪ Σ ♦ is finite. Using Lemma 15, for some t satisfying
there exists for each k ∈ Z + , a B-complete deflationary order embedding h k :
We then define the copy M k ϕ = W k ϕ , R k ϕ , V k ϕ of M yϕ as follows:
• W k ϕ is a copy of W yϕ , denoting the copy of χ, y ϕ ) ) for all χ ∈ Σ. By the induction hypothesis,
: y ∈ W } and, because W is finite, there is a y ϕ ∈ W , such that, by the induction hypothesis,
In this case, let h k be the identity function on
ϕ as a copy of M yϕ . We now define the K(A)-tree-model M = W , R, V by
If M is crisp, then for all ϕ ∈ Σ ∪ Σ ♦ , M yϕ is crisp and so also are M k ϕ for all k ∈ Z + . Hence, by construction, M is crisp. Moreover, as there are only finitely many different countable M yϕ , and we only take countably many copies of each one, M is also countable.
Observe now that for each y k ϕ ∈ R + [ x], we have that M k ϕ is the submodel of M generated by y k ϕ . Hence, by Lemma 2, for all χ ∈ Σ and y k ϕ ∈ R + [ x], (V (χ, y ϕ ) ).
Finally, we prove that V (χ, x) = V (χ, x) for all χ ∈ Σ, proceeding by induction on (χ). The base case follows directly from the definition of V . For the induction step, the cases for the non-modal connectives follow easily using the induction hypothesis. Let us just consider the case χ = ϕ = ψ (a formula in Σ ), the case χ = ♦ψ being very similar. There are two possibilities.
(i) Suppose that V ( ψ, x) = a i for some i ∈ I. Then for all z ∈ W , we have Rxz → V (ψ, z) ≥ a i . Note that it is not possible for any a ∈ A and h k defined above that h k (a) < a i ≤ a, as h k is either the identity on T (x) or is inflationary on A. So by construction, for all z ∈ W ,
Moreover, for y ϕ ∈ W ,
and by ( †) and ( ‡),
As h k is either the identity on T (x) or is inflationary on A, by construction, for all z ∈ W ,
Moreover, as in (ii) above, because W is finite, there is a y ϕ ∈ W such that
Using ( ‡) and the fact that h k is either the identity on T (x) or inflationary on A,
We obtain the following equivalence results.
Theorem 17. 
The proof of (b) is very similar, using the fact that Lemmas 10, 12, and 16 preserve crisp models.
Decidability and Complexity
Let us assume again that A is a locally homogeneous order-based algebra. In this section, we will use the finite model property of FK(A) and FK(A) C to obtain decidability and complexity results for K(A) and K(A) C in various cases. We prove, in particular, that the Gödel modal logics GK and GK C (i.e., where A is G) are both PSPACE-complete and that the same is true for the cases where A is G ↓ or G ↑ . These and other results in this section contrast with the fact that no first-order Gödel logic based on a countably infinite set of truth values is recursively axiomatizable [1] .
For simplicity of exposition, we will assume that the only constants are0 and1. To explain the ideas involved in the proofs, consider ϕ ∈ Fm and n = |Σ(ϕ)| = (ϕ)+|C L | = (ϕ)+2. To check that ϕ is not K(A)-valid, it suffices, by Lemmas 10, 12, and 16, to find a finite FK(A)-tree-model M = W, R, V, T , T ♦ of height ≤ (ϕ) with root x and |W | ≤ |Σ(ϕ)| (ϕ) ≤ n n such that V (ϕ, x) < 1.
If A is infinite, then T (x) and T ♦ (x) may also be infinite, and hence M may not be a computational object. We therefore introduce a modified version of M: Then M * and M assign the same values to a formula at any world. Moreover, for χ ∈ Σ(ϕ), the computation of V (χ, x) in M * involves only the set of values
Note that |N | ≤ 4n 2n = e n . Hence, we may assume that R and V take values in the fixed set A(e n ), where for m ∈ Z + ,
We can also assume that W is W n ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , n n }, yielding a finite structure
where W n , R + is a tree with root 0 of height ≤ n and branching ≤ n, and the sets Φ(i), Ψ(i), for i ∈ W n , determine the endpoints of a family of disjoint open intervals in A(e n ). We will call this kind of structure a (crisp if R is crisp) FK(e n )tree-model. In order to recover the connection with the original FK(A)-model, we introduce the following convenient notion. Then we obtain from the previous discussion: Proof. As observed above, ϕ ∈ Fm with n = (ϕ) + 2 is not K(A)-valid (K(A) Cvalid) if and only if there is a (crisp) FK(e n )-tree-model of the form M * (e n ) = W n , R, V, {Φ(i)} i∈Wn , {Ψ(i)} i∈Wn for which V (ϕ, 0) < 1 and the finite system A(e n ) = A(e n ), i∈Wn Φ(i), i∈Wn Ψ(i) is consistent with A.
Choose non-deterministically V : Var(ϕ) → A(e n ), R : W 2 n → A(e n ), and Φ(i), Ψ(i) ⊆ A(e n ) 2 for all i ∈ W n to obtain M * (e n ), and compute V (ϕ, 0) to verify V (ϕ, 0) < 1. This takes a number of steps bounded by a constant multiple of e n . Then utilize an oracle to verify the consistency of A(e n ) with A. , 1) , . . . , ( k l m , 1)} for some l ∈ Z + and k 1 , . . . , k l ∈ N, or is ∅. Hence in these cases the consistency problem is obviously decidable in linear time and space (null-space if the size of the input tape is not considered).
Moreover, it is easy to verify inductively that any algebra A obtained from G, G ↓ , G ↑ , and finite order-based algebras as a finite combination of ordered sums, lexicographical products, and fusion of consecutive points has a (PTIME) decidable consistency problem. In all of these cases, validity in K(A) and K(A) C is (co-NEXPTIME) decidable. This includes the case when A, as an ordered set, is isomorphic to an ordinal α + 1 < ω ω or its reverse.
The algebras G, G ↓ , G ↑ , and finite order-based algebras have the additional property that if the finite systems A(m), Φ i , Ψ i , for i = 0, . . . , k, are consistent with A, then the same holds for A(m), i≤k Φ i , i≤k Ψ i . This will allow us to improve the decidability result in these cases to PSPACE-completeness. First, however, we need a result about FK(e n )-tree-models.
Lemma 20. The following problem is PSPACE-reducible (in n) to the consistency of finite systems with A:
Given Σ = {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k } ⊆ Fm (not necessarily distinct formulas) such that k ≤ n and (ϕ j ) ≤ n for j = 1, . . . , k, and given intervals I 1 , . . . , I k ⊆ A(e n ) (closed or open at their endpoints), determine if there exists a (crisp) FK(e n )tree-model M * = W n , R, V, {Φ(i)} i∈Wn , {Ψ(i)} i∈Wn with root 0 and height ≤ n such that V (ϕ j , 0) ∈ I j , for j = 1, . . . , k, and for i ∈ W n , the system A(e n ), Φ(i), Ψ(i) is consistent with A.
Proof. As PSPACE = NPSPACE (see [32] ), it suffices to give a non-deterministic polynomial space algorithm to produce the FK(e n )-tree-mode M * . Because the full model may need exponential space to be displayed, our strategy is to search sequentially the branches of M * , from the root down, so that all branches are built in the same polynomial space. This is the basic idea of Ladner's proof in [25] of the PSPACE complexity of the classical modal logic K. We do not try to optimize the space bound but show that 22n 5 does the job.
Input. Each value in A(e n ) may be represented by a binary word of length at most log e n ≤ 2n 2 , and the only information we need from the input, besides Σ, is the maximum (strictly smaller than 1) of A(e n ) and the endpoints of the intervals I j , indicating if they are included or not in the intervals. We consider also as part of the input a particular world x ∈ W n , written in binary notation (length ≤ log n n ≤ n 2 ). At the initial stage, x = 0. With appropriate markings in the formulas, we may also assume that each ϕ j appears decomposed in the form:
where P = {p 1 , . . . , p l } ⊆ Var and χ j (p 1 , . . . , p l , q 1 , . . . , q n j , s 1 , . . . , s m j ) is a non-modal formula. Set:
. . , ψ j n j : j = 1, . . . , k}, S ♦ = {♦θ j 1 , . . . , ♦θ j m j : j = 1, . . . , k}, F = {ψ j 1 , . . . , ψ j n j : j = 1, . . . , k}, F ♦ = {θ j 1 , . . . , θ j m j : j = 1, . . . , k}.
Note that the input may be displayed in space at most 3n 2 + (1 + 2n)2n 2 ≤ 9n 3 .
Step 1. Choose values V (ρ, x) ∈ A(e n ), for all ρ ∈ P ∪ S ∪ S ♦ , and verify that V (ϕ j , x) ∈ I j for each j ≤ k.
Choose partial functions x] and verify that the finite system A(e n ), Φ(x), Ψ(x) is consistent with A. Each a ∈ G plays the role of a "right accumulation point" and c a plays the role of a "witness of right homogeneity" at a; similarly, each b ∈ H plays the role of a "left accumulation point" and d b plays the role of a "witness of left homogeneity" at b. An oracle for the consistency problem must certify that this distribution can be realized in A.
Choose also worlds y 1 , . . . , y m ∈ W n for m ≤ n in the next level of the tree and values Rxy t ∈ A(e n ) for t = 1, . . . , m.
Note that the space required to perform this step and store the data produced is at most 3n · 2n 2 + n · n 2 = 7n 3 . The values of the desired tree-model M * are guessed at the root. Hence, this model exists if and only if it is possible to find further (crisp, if necessary) FK(e n )-tree-models M * t of height ≤ n − 1 with respective roots y t , for t = 1, . . . , m, such that for any ρ ∈ F ∪ F ♦ ,
If F t (F t ♦ ) denotes the set of ρ ∈ F (ρ ∈ F ♦ ) for which the minimum (maximum) associated to ρ above is realized at y t , then the situation ρ ∈ F t ♦ , V (♦ρ, x) = b ∈ H and Rxy t ≤ d b does not arise and, similarly, the situation ρ ∈ F t ♦ , and Rxy t < V (♦ρ, x) ∈ H is impossible. Moreover, the above conditions are equivalent to asking for all t and ρ:
These conditions are equivalent, in turn, to asking that for each model M * t and ρ ∈ F ∪ F ♦ , the value V (ρ, y t ) belongs to the interval I ρ,t , fixed to be
But this amounts to the original problem: the existence of M * t with root y t satisfying the conditions of the lemma for the input Σ = F ∪ F ♦ and intervals I ρ,t , ρ ∈ Σ . This justifies the next steps of the algorithm.
Step 2. Find coverings F = t∈ (1,m] 
∈ H do not arise, and compute for each t and ρ ∈ F ∪ F ♦ the interval I ρ,t .
Note that computing and storing the data produced in this step requires space at most 2n · n 2 + 2n 2 · 2n 2 ≤ 6n 4 .
Step 3. For t = 1, . . . , m, return consecutively to Step 1 with input: Σ = F ∪ F ♦ , {I ρ,t : ρ ∈ Σ }, and x = y t , traversing the resulting tree of worlds in pre-order; that is, the leftmost branch is exhausted before passing to the next unexplored sub-branch at the right.
Note that the cyclic repetition of Steps 1 and 2 (an exponential number of times), if successful at each stage, runs through a tree of height less than n, so the space needed to guess a branch of the tree is at most 22n 5 . The key point is that having verified successfully the existence of a branch we may utilize the same space for the next one, and thus the total space required is bounded by 22n 5 . Informally, returning to Step 1 with t = 1 starts a search for M * 1 , after finishing it successfully, we return to Step 1 with t = 2 and utilize the same space, bounded by 22n 4 (n − 1), to search for M * 2 , etc. Adding to this common space the space of the first cycle, we obtain 22n 5 . Proof. Lemma 20 applied to a formula ϕ and the interval I = [0, 1) yields a PSPACE algorithm in the length of ϕ to determine for these algebras, whether there is an FK(e n )-tree-model for which V (ϕ, 0) < 1 and A(e n ), Φ(i), Ψ(i) is consistent with A, for each i ∈ W n ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , n n }. The latter condition is equivalent to consistency with A of A(e n ), i∈Wn Φ(i), i∈Wn Ψ(i) . The existence of this model is equivalent, recalling the earlier discussion in this section, to the existence of a K(A)-counter-model for ϕ. The lower bound follows from the fact that classical modal logic K is PSPACE-hard [25] and can be interpreted faithfully in K(A) or K(A) C by the double negation interpretation which adds ¬¬ in front of any subformula of a formula.
Note that the last theorem applies to any algebra for which the consistency problem is PSPACE decidable and the union of consistent finite systems is consistent. Examples of these algebras are finite algebras (trivially), the ordinals ω n + 1, n ∈ N + , and their reverse orders. We also expect that PSPACE-completeness holds for all finite combinations of G, G ↓ , G ↑ , and finite algebras built via ordered sums, lexicographical products, and fusion of consecutive points, but will not prove this here.
To generalize the results in this section to languages with a finite set of constants C L = {c 1 < . . . < c l }, utilize a set of values A (e n ) containing an isomorphic copy 
Order-Based Crisp S5 Logics
As in the classical setting, further many-valued modal logics may be defined for a given order-based algebra A as logics of particular classes of K(A)-models (see, e.g., [9, 10] ). In this section, we restrict our attention to proving decidability and co-NP-completeness for crisp order-based "S5" logics that may be understood also as one-variable fragments of order-based first-order logics. In particular, we give a positive answer to the open decidability problem (and establish co-NPcompleteness) for validity in the one-variable fragment of first-order Gödel logic (see, e.g., [19, Chapter 9, Problem 13] ).
We define an S5(A) C -model to be a K(A) C -model M = W, V, R such that R is an equivalence relation. We call M universal if R = W × W and in this case just write M = W, V , noting that the clauses for and ♦ simplify to
The following lemma is an immediate corollary of Lemma 2 and the fact that the generated submodel of an S5(A) C -model is universal. It follows that each order-based modal logic S5(A) C may be viewed as the onevariable fragment of a corresponding order-based first-order logic. Rather than define this first-order logic and then restrict to its one-variable fragment, let us simply note that the first-order translation of ϕ ∈ Fm is obtained by replacing each propositional variable p with the predicate p(x), with ∀x, and ♦ with ∃x. In particular, S5(G) C is the Gödel modal logic GS5 C corresponding to the one-variable fragment of first-order Gödel logic (see, e.g., [1, 19] ). GS5 C is axiomatized in [10] as an extension of the intuitionistic modal logic MIPC studied in [7, 31] with the prelinearity axiom schema (ϕ → ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ) and ( ϕ ∨ ψ) → ( ϕ ∨ ψ). Let us also remark in passing that the logic GS5 based on non-crisp frames may be axiomatized as MIPC extended with just prelinearity [10] , and that decidability of the validity problem follows from the finite model property for the semantics with two accessibility relations [3] . The infinite K(A)-model defined in the proof of Theorem 7 for the formula ¬¬p → ¬¬ p is a universal S5(A) C -model. Hence, if the universe of A is [0, 1] or G ↓ , then S5(A) C does not have the finite model property. Also, as in Theorem 6, the logic S5(G ↑ ) C has the finite model property, but not if ∆ is added to the language. We will prove decidability for these and other cases here using again a new equivalent semantics.
Let us assume once more that A is a locally homogeneous order-based algebra. We define an We call M universal if R = W × W and in this case write M = W, V, T , T ♦ , where T and T ♦ may now be understood as fixed subsets of A, and the clauses for and ♦ simplify to
Note in particular that, by condition (i), in universal S5(A) C -models and FS5(A) Cmodels, the truth values of box-formulas and diamond-formulas are independent of the world.
The new condition (ii) for FS5(A) C -models reflects the fact that we deal here with universal models not tree models and must therefore take into account the values of diamond-formulas and box-formulas when fixing the values in T and T ♦ , respectively. It is easily shown that (ii) extends inductively for universal FS5(A) C -models to the following condition on all diamond and box formulas:
We now show that S5(A) C -validity is equivalent to validity in finite universal FS5(A) C -models, following fairly closely the corresponding proofs from previous sections. 
noting that these sets are independent of the choice of the world x ∈ W . For each i ∈ I, choose a witness of right homogeneity c i at a i such that the intervals (a i , c i ) are pairwise disjoint for all i ∈ I, and
Similarly, for each j ∈ J, choose a witness of left homogeneity d j at b j such that the intervals (d j , b j ) are pairwise disjoint for all j ∈ J, and
We define Note that the number of intervals omitted from T and T ♦ , defined in Lemma 24, is smaller than or equal to the cardinality of Σ and Σ ♦ , respectively, for the given fragment Σ. Consider T = A \ i∈I (a i , c i ) and T ♦ = A \ j∈J (d j , b j ) for finite (possibly empty) sets I, J, where for each i ∈ I, right homogeneity at a i ∈ R(A) is witnessed by c i such that the intervals (a i , c i ) are pairwise disjoint, and, similarly, for each j ∈ J, left homogeneity at b j ∈ L(A) is witnessed by d j such that the intervals (d j , b j ) are pairwise disjoint. We define a family of C L -order embeddings {h k : A → A} k∈Z + such that • for each even k ∈ Z + , h k is the identity function on T and for each i ∈ I,
• for each odd k ∈ Z + , h k is the identity function on T ♦ and for each j ∈ J, It suffices now to prove that for all ϕ ∈ Fm, x ∈ W , and k ∈ N,
proceeding by induction on (ϕ). The base case follows by definition, while for the non-modal connectives, the argument is the same as in the proof of Lemma 1. Consider ϕ = ♦ψ. Fix x ∈ W and k ∈ N. There are two cases.
(a) Suppose that V (♦ψ, x) = b j for some j ∈ J. Note first that by Lemma 23, V (♦ψ, x) = b j ∈ T ♦ ∪ T and hence h k (b j ) = b j . Clearly V (ψ, z) ≤ b j for all z ∈ W . Hence, by the induction hypothesis and the construction of {h n : A → A} n∈N , for all n ∈ N and z n ∈ W , V (ψ, z n ) = h n (V (ψ, z)) ≤ b j .
Also, for some y ∈ W , V (ψ, y) ∈ (d j , b j ].
Hence for any odd n ∈ N,
Using the induction hypothesis, (V (♦ψ, x) ).
Combining Lemmas 22, 24, and 25, we obtain the following equivalence. (that is, fewer than n 2 values) and the endpoints of the intervals defining T and T ♦ (that is, fewer than 2n values). So, we need at most 3n 2 distinct values. Therefore, we may assume that these values are in a fixed finite set A n = A(p(n)) = {0, 1 p(n) , . . . , p(n)−1 p(n) , 1}, containing properly spaced copies of constants, where p(n) = 3|C L |n 2 . We may assume also that W = W n ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. Then checking non-deterministically that ϕ is not valid amounts to performing the following steps:
• Is validity in the two-variable fragment of first-order Gödel logic decidable?
Notably, validity in the two-variable fragment of first-order classical logic (indeed, any first-order tabular intermediate logic) is decidable [29] , while the same fragment of first-order intuitionistic logic is undecidable [24] .
